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SOME POINTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN LEGISLATION, AS TO MARRIED
WOMEN'S PROPERTY.
THE English law on the property rights of married women is to
us only less important than our own. We do not, indeed,
look to it for authority-in this department of law the mother
country has followed us, and not we the mother country-but,
not to speak of "the special ties between us, the attitude of England towards this as yet unsolved social-not less than legalquestion, must be interesting; for it is England which now more
than any other nation unites a cautious radicalism and an enlightened conservatism in the treatment of the questions with which the
time is grappling.
According to a contemporary writer on jurisprudence, (Prof.
Sheldon Amos, Science of Jurisprudence), there are three
methods which laws relating to married persons may pursue:
1. Where married persons retain the same property rights
and capacities as before, subject to the duty of maintaining the
household and family. " This," he says, "seems to be the method
to which the best European legislation is constantly tending, and
which has nearly been completely developed in some of the United
States of America."
2. Where some artificial relationship is created by the marriage. An instance of this is afforded by the English Common
Law of Husband and Wife.
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3. Where the artificial relationship is created, but the parties
are left a discretion to qualify the nature of this relationship. The
equity "Separate Estate" and some Continental systems are
examples.
The first of thege methods is that to which England, by the Act
of 1870, and still further by the Married Woman's Property Act
of 1882, has, like ourselves, given adherence.
Now though the two nations have reached the same point, the
conditions from and through which they came to it differed widely.
The common law as to baron and feme prevailed, indeed, in both
countries, but here the parallel ceases. Not to delay upon the
origin or present rules of the equity separate estate, suffice it to
say, that it has been for a long time possible in England, for property to be held by a married woman with almost full power of
control and disposition. The doctrines of a wife's equity to a
settlement, and the settlement required at the marriage of a ward
of chancery, show the solicitude of that court to protect a wife's
rights.
Few marriages among the upper classes, or where much property is involved, take place without a careful settlement of that
property. It is upon married women in the poorer classes whose
scanty earnings are their all, that the common law bears hardest.
In America, the separate use has never been universal. Fully
grown in England only at a period subsequ6nt to the settlement
of this country, it was administered in certain states, as New York,
New Jersey and portions of the South. In New England it was
hardly known. (Schouler, Husband and Wife, 248 ff). Some
states had no equity system. Nor was the separate estate so
necessary .in a new, poor, rapidly-growing country, the needs of
which required that money should be tied up as little as possible.
Thus in America, for a time, there was not need enough of
married womeB's laws to overcome old doctrines, and in England
the class which most required protection had least power to make
itself heard.
Our purpose does not admit of any examination of the American
married women's acts iii general, or of any state in particular.
They have been fully commented on by courts and text writers,
and, as has been said, "to attempt a useful summary of "laws so
incongruous, so purely local and so constantly changing, is
useless." (Schouler, Husband and Wife 254.)
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Although some older states, even in the last century, had "feme
sole trader" laws, or the germs of them, the movement really began
about the year 1850, by several states passing general acts which
have since, year by year, been added to, attended meantime by a
judicial construction often unfriendly to the actual, if not the legal
intention of the framers, until all the states have joined the movement, the last to follow being Virginia, in 1877.
England began later than America, and has proceeded with less
legislation and mQre indication of some definite plan. Her first
step was similar to ours. A clause in the Matrimonial and Divorce
Causes Act of 1857, gave to a woman deserted by or judicially
separated from her husband, power to act as afeme sole, obtaining
in the former case from a court or magistrate a so-called protection
order against her husband's creditors. A curious statute in 1878
allowed the same privilege in cases of aggravated assault upon her
by her huisband. (41 & 42 Vict. c. 19, s. 4.) But the first real
Married Woman's Act was that of 1870, which, though now
repealed, calls for some notice. This act gave a married woman
her earnings and the right to trade; allowed her to deposit in
banks, and to hold and transfer stocks, loans and so forth, as if
sole; suffered her to hold to her separate use any property
descending to her from an intestate, and money coming to her by
deed and will, not exceeding in amount 2001. ; and empowered
her to sue or -be sued alone in matters relating to her separate
property. (Her powers extended to a suit for libel: L. R., 10 Q.
B. 147.) She might insure her husband's life; hewas not liable
for her ante-nuptial debts except (by an amendment in 1874) as
far as he had got assets of hers. She was liable to the parish for
support of husband and children. An excellent feature of the act
was the provision for a summary and private settlement of disputes
between husband and wife as to her separate property. (See on
this act a Treatise on M. W. Prop. Act 1870, Griffith.) Now
this act was evidently intended to supplement, not to supplant the
equity separate use. The right to earnings and to embark in
trade, was a measure of relief to the poorer classes to whom the
doctrine of separate use was of no real benefit. The same is true
of the 2001. taken under deed or will. Large amounts under deed
or will could only be held separately by a regular settlement, as
before. In cases of intestacy she was given the benefit of the
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possibility that the intestate had contemplated making such settle
ment.
Twelve years later was passed the Married Woman's Property Act
1882, introduced by Lord SELBORNE, and taking effect January 1st
of this year. And here special reference to the equity separate
estate is not to be found. By this act a married woman is "capable
of acquiring, holding and disposing by will or otherwise, of any real
or personal property as her separate property as if she were a feme
sole, without the intervention of any trustee." She may contract,
including the acceptance of any trusteeship or the office of executor or administrator, and sue and be sued without the joinder of
her husband. If she trades she is subject to the bankrupt laws.
She may deposit in banks, hold and transfer stocks, &c., insure
her own or her husband's life, has every remedy civil and criminal
for protection of her separate property, even against her husband,
with certain exceptions to be noticed hereafter. Property questions
between husband and wife may be decided summarily, and, if
desired, privately, before a judge. The provisions of the previous
act as to his liability for her ante-nuptial debts, and her liability
d for support of husband and children are continued. It is also
provided that her "legal, personal representative" shall succeed to
her property rights, and expressly allows existing or future settlements.
Only one or two decisions on this act have appeared, but these
give it a liberal interpretation:
In In re Mareh, 52 L. J., Chancery 650, a testatrix gave property, real and personal, to "A. and B., and E., the wife of
B." Mr. Justice CHITTY held, that the Act of 1882 had wrought
such alteration in the relations of husband and wife as to sever that
unity of person which the law attributed to them, and therefore B.
and E. took each a third of the property, and not a half between
them.
In th~e Goods of Harriet Ay]res, L. R., 8 Prob. Div. 168, it
was held, that under this act a husband need not join in his wife's
administration bond; he had no responsibility.
In James v. Barraud, 31 W. R. 786, it was held, that a married woman might sue in her own name under this act for torts
committed before the act.
Taking up now some points of comparison between this act and
our American legislation; in the first place the act provides that
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it shall operate upon parties already married, but not affect proSome of our
perty the title to which has already accrued.
American statutes have neglected to include such a provision, at
the cost of some litigation, though the courts interpret these acts
as respecting vested rights. (Bishop on the Law of Married
Women, § 37.)
It is worth while to remark, in passing, that the very first section
of the first English Act (1870) deals with earnings and trading,
while only the later American statutes confer these rights independent of the desertion, absence, and the like, of the husband.
(1 Bishop 417.)
A novel feature of the English act is its treatment of the
question of presumptions which has given so much trouble
here, especially in Pennsylvania. A married woman's contract
is presumed to be with reference to her separate estate, and in
prqceedings for the protection of her property her allegation of
ownership is sufficient. The burden of proof lies on the other
side. The rule here is almost universally the other way (New
York and New Jersey, at least, are exceptions), though no state,
it is believed, has decided the question by statute, except those in
which a schedule of the wife's separate property is required to be
put on record, either as a requisite to title or merelf as notice to
creditors. (Among these are Maine, Florida, Minnesota, California,
formerly Iowa.) The plan of the English statute seems preferable
as more in accord with the design of married women's laws. (See
argument, contra, Heeney v. Good, 21 Penn. St. 354 ) As to
the registry system, praised though it has been, is it well that
every married woman with property should have to submit a catalogue of it to the general scrutiny, especially in a country where
publicity to private and personal affairs is becoming an "institution ?"
That part of the act is worthy of notice which provides that
money lent by wife to husband gives her a standing as creditor of
his estate only after claims of other cr'editors have been satisfied.
As gathered from the decisions-for the statutes are silent on the
subject-it is otherwise here, the wife coming in pari passu, or, as
in Ohio, as a preferred creditor. (See cases in Wells Sep. Prop.
Married Women, p. 372, ff.) Perhaps, by the English rule, temptation as to fraud is made less.
The section on insurance of the husband's life by the wife
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obtains here in various forms, some codes limiting the amount of
premiums, and a few, as Arkansas and North Carolina, allowing a
limited premium out of the husband's funds
The section on remedies gives the fullest power of suing and
being sued in matters of property ; but actions between husband
and wife for a tort are still interdicted; as are any criminal proceedings between husband and wife concerning property while the
parties are living together, or where the cause of action arose while
they were living together, unless property is wrongfully taken by
one party about to desert the other. (The act expressly provides
that he shall have all remedies against her, in matters of property,
which she has against him.) No one of our states, it is believed,
goes so far as to admit criminal proceedings concerning property
between married persons, thouigh by some codes a wife may be
convicted of arson for firing her husband's building. In all proceedings under this section of the Act of 1882 husband and wife
have full power to testify. Before the Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, s.),
married persons could give evidence for and against each other, save
in cases of adultery, in criminal prosecutions, and as to communications during coverture. Our own laws vary as to the power of
husband and wife to testify, though, as hardly need be said, most
of them have departed from the common-law doctrines on this
point. In one state, Maine, exists a curious law that the power
of one party to testify depends up6n the consent of the other.
That provision of the act which makes the husband liable for his
wife's ante-nuptial debts to the extent of any property of hers of
which he has gained possession, and which first appeared, as will
be remembered, in 1874, as an amendment to the Act of 1870,
though of obvious justice, finds a place as far as we know in the
codes of only seven states. (New York, West Virginia, Georgia,
Florida, Kentucky, Indiana, Colorado.)
So also the liability of the wife for her husband's support, which
the English act enforces, is law in very few of the United States.
-(Nevada, Ty. of Dacotah; Iowa, liable for expenses of family;
llinois, must support poor relatives.) It is in this connection that
Mr. Bishop (1 Married Women, § 897), complains that our statutes
have given wives an independent estate without any corresponding
burden.
The English act provides that for the purposes of the act the
legal personal representative of any married woman shall, in
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respect to her estate, have the same rights and liabilities, and be
subject to the same jurisdiction that she would. This would seem
to take away all claim of the husband to take or to administer upon
her personal property. As to curtesy the act is silent, but its
existence may be doubted. (Curtesy has been held not always to
exist under the equity separate use: L. R., 3 Eq. 267, and cases
cited; contra, L. R., 8 Eq. 139.) It will be remembered that as
far back as 1834 the Dower Act put it in the power of a husband
to bar his wife's dower by a declaratory deed. Many of the
United States have abolished curtesy and dower eo nomine-hardly
one of them but gives the surviving husband or wife some share
in the estate of the other, unless it be the Territory of Dacotah,
which confines property interests between married persons to mutual
rights of support and habitation each in the dwelling of the other.
Random and incomplete as have been the foregeing observations they afford ground for one or two general remarks. In the
first place the English Act is clear, connected, and watchful to
guard against abuses of the privileges it extends. Making allowance for the fact that in this department of legislation the United
States were pioneers and had to break ground for themselves, it is
only repeating the common verdict of law writers to say that the
statutes of most of our states are too numerous, are sometimes
inconsistent, and are often without definite aim, unless a vague
desire to increase the rights of married women can be so called.
Mr. Bishop, in a work to which we have already referred, speaks
of his own state as one the legislation of which "almost ever since
the popular agitation of this subject of married women's laws commenced, has been travelling forward seeking rest and finding none."
In the state with which the present writer is best acquainted, which
has not departed as far from the old law as have some others, no
less than twenty-two statutes have been passed since the year 1848.
One or two perhaps rather trivial instances of these may be given.
In 1874 appeared a law empowering married women to contract for,
the purchase of sewing-machines. Now what was wanted was some
comprehensive enactment, under which a woman burdened with a
worthless husband might contract for any instrument or article
whereby she could gain a livelihood. As it is, the act would
seem to indicate either that its author could take in the idea of but
one material object at a time, or that it was passed in the interest
of a sewing-machine company.
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Again, in 1871, a married woman was empowered to transfer
railroad stocks. In 1874 the power was extended to state and
city loans and shares of stock of any corporation, and the next
year came a statute word for word the same as the other, except as
inserting the word "loans ;" making the act extend to loans as
well as stock of'private corporations. This important point had
apparently been quite overlooked the year before, and this in an
enactment of one short section. Thus three separate acts were
required to give a married woman power over kinds of property
substantially identical.
Radical as the English Act of 1882 is in its effect upon the
property, we think there is traceable in it some effQrt to preserve
thepersonal relation of husband and wife. Note the interdiction
in an otherwise sweeping section on remedies, of suits between
husband and .wife for torts, and of criminal actions as to property
where the cause of action arises while the parties are living together,
and the admirable method for a speedy and private, and therefore
scandal-avoiding, settling of property disputes between husband
and wife in the civil courts. Many of our American codes have
the same tendency, we do not know whether to call it aim. But
our married women's laws are confessedly in a transition state.
Some go too far; others not far enough. Some unsettle the old
law without forming a new one. Some most advanced codes retain
unimportant, vexatious restrictions out of harmony with the general
scope of the law.
The problem in married women's laws lies here-how to attain
the utmost property rights consistently with the preservation of
the family relation upon which-as the discussion of our divorce
system which is now taking place will show-the healthy life of
organized society depends. The two, we think, are not necessarily
inconsistent. How to establish the one without unsettling the
,other is the by no means easy task which awaits our law makers.
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